

BOOK REVIEWS

TERRENCE THOMSON, *Metaphysics of Nature and Failure in Kant's Opus postumum*, London *et al.*, Bloomsbury, 2025, pp. 203 (ISBN: 9781350414310).

Metaphysics of Nature and Failure in Kant's Opus postumum is Terrence Thomson's first monograph, based on the doctoral dissertation with which he completed his PhD at Kingston University London in 2022. Along with Bryan Hall's *The Post-Critical Kant: Understanding the Critical Philosophy through the Opus postumum* (2017), the volume *Perspectives on Kant's Opus postumum* (2023), and Stephen Howard's *Kant's Late Philosophy of Nature: The Opus postumum* (2023), Thomson's book is unquestionably among the most significant contributions to the study of Kant's final project published in the last decade. Focusing on five key topics of the *Opus postumum*, which structure the book's five chapters, Thomson aims to show that Kant, in this writing, seeks to fulfill the promise of critical philosophy to produce a metaphysics of nature. Yet, as Thomson argues, the attempt is ultimately doomed to fail, highlighting a fundamental inability of critical philosophy to generate a metaphysical doctrine.

In the first chapter of his book, Thomson examines the interpretation that the term 'transition' acquires in the *Opus postumum*. This is a key concept because, as is well known, the central theme of Kant's final work is the transition from the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* to physics. Thomson argues, however, that this transition must be understood in a broader sense, as it points to a movement intrinsic to critical philosophy itself and draws attention to the great absentee of Kantian philosophy, 'the phantom', that haunts the critical system: the metaphysics of nature. Kant initially conceived the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a preparatory study (one that investigates *a priori* principles) for a system of transcendental philosophy (one grounded in those principles). In other words, a critique of pure reason is supposed to generate a system, and more precisely, to transition from the status of a merely preparatory inquiry to that of a metaphysical system. Yet the *Critique of Pure Reason* fails to deliver on its promise to present a system of the metaphysics of nature: «it is promised

but never delivered» (p. 15). This, Thomson claims, is the gap Kant set out to bridge in his final project. A gap that, despite Kant's intentions, remains unbridgeable: «[...] perhaps the gap refers to the system of speculative reason, i.e. the long-awaited and much-promised theoretical metaphysics of nature» (p. 14). Hence, the thesis at the heart of Thomson's work: «[...] the gap left by the so-called critical 'system' is the system itself» (p. 15).

The metaphysics of nature, announced in the preface to the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (A xxi), remains on the horizon of philosophy even in the second edition (B xliii). This confirms that the *Metaphysical Foundations*, published a year before the second edition of the first *Critique*, cannot be considered the realization of the metaphysics of nature toward which the *Critique* is oriented. Furthermore, the vacillations in the *Architectonic of Pure Reason* regarding the relationship between ontology and transcendental philosophy reveal a tendency that, according to Thomson (who follows Eckhard Förster), becomes explicit in the *Opus postumum*: the collapse of the distinction between transcendental philosophy and metaphysics (pp. 19-25). The Kantian notion of *Übergang* should therefore be understood, Thomson argues, merely as an instrument, «a tool for getting to the system that the critical philosophy was clearing the ground for, such that every time Kant makes the distinction between an *a priori* principle and an empirical principle under the rubric of a need for transition between them, underpinning it is a broader, more vital need to move towards a unified system of speculative reason» (p. 32). In fact, the very idea of a 'bridge' connecting two heterogeneous domains, such as the metaphysics of nature and physics, or more broadly, foundational principles and system, is an illusion, a *Fata Morgana*, to use Adickes' words (pp. 35-38). The *Opus postumum* does not reveal a pre-established harmony between metaphysics and physics; rather, it displays Kant's constant and ultimately futile attempt to distinguish, define, and connect the two domains in order to achieve the unity of a system. The *Opus postumum* was not left incomplete merely for contingent reasons related to Kant's declining strength. It is destined to remain incomplete because Kant set himself an impossible task. The incompleteness of the *Opus postumum*, Thomson argues, «is actually a constitutive element of the entire critical philosophy» (p. 39).

The second chapter addresses the theme that dominates the initial drafts of the *Opus postumum*: the attempt to establish a system of the

elementary forces of matter. According to Thomson, Kant seeks through such a system to develop a doctrine of forces, but succeeds only in showing the impossibility of classifying driving forces according to the categories and, at the same time, of conceiving them as conditions of ontological or material possibility. This inquiry into the system of driving forces of matter continues the project of the *Metaphysical Foundations*, where Kant attempts to develop a dynamic theory of matter. Thomson argues that the tensions that emerge in the *Opus postumum* are, in a certain sense, already anticipated in the *Metaphysical Foundations*, where Kant appeals to an original repulsive force to explain the constitution of matter, thereby giving that repulsive force an ontological character. At the same time, Kant is compelled to pair this force with a fundamental attractive force in order to account for movement, thus interpreting matter solely through external relations and the category of causality. The tension between the ontological and transcendental levels, between the material and the categorical, is therefore already present in the dynamic theory of matter of 1786 (pp. 49-52).

Thomson notes that, from the standpoint of critical philosophy, fundamental forces, as such, cannot be conceived through the categories of reality, negation, and limitation, since they do not correspond to an object. They are therefore inadequate tools for developing a doctrine of forces (and not simply of fundamental forces). This, Thomson argues, is why Kant raises the issue of an elementary system of forces in the *Opus postumum* (p. 56). Kant's early attempts to categorize forces rely on distinctions between attractive and repulsive forces, or internal and external forces, presupposing a forced symmetry between them. Yet these distinctions, and the forced symmetry they require, prove unstable, giving rise to attempts that are repeatedly interrupted and remain unfinished (pp. 60-63). The failure to develop a doctrine of fundamental forces compatible with categories leads Kant to introduce the notion of caloric, thereby shifting from a categorical conception to a transcendental dynamic. As Thomson observes, caloric has an elusive character: it is the condition of possibility for the coercibility and ponderability of matter, yet it is itself incoercible and imponderable (pp. 67-71). In this sense, it is «not full and yet is the condition of possibility for fullness» (p. 73). In the *Opus postumum*, caloric is therefore conceived as «a *constitutive* nothing giving rise to experience», and is contrasted with empty space as «the *absolute* nothing»: «if caloric is the transcendental object rendered through fundamental forces then

empty space must be the thing in itself understood as the world without us» (p. 73) In other words, Kant seeks to ground his doctrine of fundamental forces by placing the emptiness of caloric, a notion he himself considers inconceivable, at the core of the transcendental. For this reason, his efforts to establish a transcendental dynamic are destined to fail. Yet in the move from a dynamic theory grounded in categories to one grounded in caloric, the transition from transcendental philosophy to ontology is effectively accomplished.

These considerations on caloric pave the way for the third chapter of Thomson's monograph, which is devoted to the concept of ether in the drafts *Übergang 1–14*. Thomson does not intend to offer yet another reconstruction of Kant's multiple attempts to prove or deduce the concept of ether (p. 94). Instead, he is primarily interested in highlighting the ambivalence (*Zweideutigkeit*) of the notion, its tendency to lean both toward the *Transcendental Analytic* and the *Transcendental Dialectic* without bridging the gap between the domain of intellectual concepts and that of speculative reason: «Aether doesn't bridge the *Transcendental Analytic* and *Transcendental Dialectic* nor does it calmly nestle between them, rather it emphasizes the intrusion of the one into the other» (p. 77). Ether is, as it were, homeless, located on the shoreline between the firm ground of the principles of experience and the ocean of the unconditional.

On the one hand, Kant describes ether as a continuously oscillating, spatially permanent matter that penetrates all bodies. In this way, ether becomes «the highest [*oberste*] principle [*Princip*] for the possibility of experience of outer sensible beings [*Sinnenwesen*]' (OP 21: 228, 75)» (p. 97), that is, a principle of the intellect. Yet the object corresponding to this concept cannot be taken as a hypothetical material. This generates a challenge for Kant: «[...] prove this outer material without either plunging it into the ocean of the idea, or jamming it up with the contingency of an object of possible experience» (p. 98). On the other hand, in some passages Kant attributes to ether the hypothetical character of an idea of reason. A matter such as ether «if it has an *a priori* ground [*Grund*], it must emerge [*hervorgehen*] from reason as an idea' (OP 22:552, 87 [...])» (p. 100). Thomson further notes that the so-called proofs of the existence of ether are apagogical or indirect demonstrations, characteristic of transcendental ideas (pp. 100-102). Yet even when Kant seems to present ether as an idea of reason, he quickly adds that it should nevertheless be regarded as a given

object of experience. Kant himself admits that it is an ambivalent, even 'strange' (*befremdlich*) concept whose existence seems impossible to prove: «It is strange: it appears impossible to want to *a priori* prove the existence [*Existenz*] of an Object [*Gegenstand*] of the senses and object [*Objects*] of a merely possible experience' (OP 21: 538 [...])» (p. 105).

The fourth chapter is devoted almost entirely to the question of the subject's self-positioning, a theme that appears in the draft *Convolut VII* of the *Opus postumum*. In doing so, Thomson decides, without offering much explanation, to gloss over the draft *Convolut X/XI*, by far the most extensive draft of the *Opus postumum*, in which Kant addresses a series of problems concerning the concept of physics, indirect phenomena, and the self-affection of the subject. Thomson offers only brief remarks on these themes (pp. 110-114), even though *Convolut X/XI* is essential for understanding the transition from the demonstration of ether to the notion of the subject's self-positioning. Instead, Thomson devotes ample space to reconstructing the theme of self-positioning across Kant's writings, drawing on the first *Critique* (the additions to the *Transcendental Aesthetic* in the second edition and the *Paralogisms*) as well as Kant's anthropological writings (*Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* and *On the Organ of the Soul*). This reconstruction of the background to the reflections in *Convolut VII* is rich in original and insightful ideas (pp. 114-128). The passages in *Convolut VII* that discuss the subject positing itself as object seem, at first glance, paradoxical and even at odds with the results of the *Paralogisms of Pure Reason*, which refute all attempts to determine the soul as substance through mere speculation. Yet these passages show the overcoming of a strict opposition between subject and object: «[...] the subject positing itself as object is no longer fully subject nor fully object—the terms themselves fold into one another [...]» (p. 129). In positing itself as object, the subject interprets itself as an object in the world while remaining incapable of knowing itself; in this sense, it does not abolish what Thomson calls «the poverty of the transcendental» (p. 114). What evolves instead is the idea of the world: «[...] what was *Welt* in the 'Übergang' drafts becomes akin to *Umwelt* in fascicle VII, but an *Umwelt* wholly instantiated by the activity of the subject. [...] To posit one's self as object means [...] creating a house around oneself [...]» (p. 133). Yet the I placed in the world, the I through which the thinking I represents itself, remains an empty form: «Kant searches for a suitable object of the I such that it

wouldn't be empty, and yet he finds only the positing of an empty object (a throwing-out of nothing) because to objectively fill the poverty of the transcendental subject is to take away its status as condition of possibility, that is, to transform it into the soul as it was understood in the Paralogisms» (p. 138).

In the fifth and final chapter, Thomson turns to analyzing fascicle I, the last draft of the *Opus postumum*, in chronological order. Here Kant's notes become increasingly concise, reduced almost to aphorisms. However, according to Thomson, they still reveal Kant's awareness of his desire to complete a system of metaphysics, a desire that is continually confronted with the impossibility of such an undertaking. Gradually, Kant comes to see man as the mediation, the *copula*, and the transition between the world and God. But in doing so, he ultimately renders futile any attempt to realize either a metaphysics of nature or a transition. On the one hand, «the critical philosophy must deliver on its promise of a system of metaphysics (the highest standpoint of transcendental philosophy or a system of pure reason)» (p. 148). On the other hand, «The only standpoint available to us is the human being inhabiting the world, a *Weltwesen* that is internally aporetic, a pure, empty intermediary that cannot fully take a stance on itself because it has been bound so closely to its own sensible appearance by critical philosophy itself» (p. 148 f.). The human being situated in the sensible world lacks the power to transcend its limits: «[...] the propaedeutic confines metaphysics to human capacity and thereby blocks metaphysics» (p. 151). The only metaphysics available to man is, therefore, always and only a future metaphysics.

In summary, Thomson states that he aligns with Burkhard Tuschling's line of interpretation, while acknowledging significant differences between their respective approaches (p. 3). Tuschling argued that, in the *Opus postumum*, Kant undertook a profound revision first of the *Metaphysical Foundations* and then of the first *Critique*, seeking to replace them with a transcendental dynamic and a Spinozist-Schellingian philosophy of nature. Thomson, however, adopts a more moderate position, maintaining only that Kantian thought contains an inherent need for transcendental critical philosophy to evolve into a metaphysics of nature. For this reason, Thomson distances himself from those who regard the *Opus postumum* as «nothing more than an afterthought or remark on critical philosophy» (p. 3). On the contrary, for Thomson, Kant in the

Opus postumum makes one final, desperate attempt to move from transcendental critical philosophy to a metaphysical system. Thus, the impossibility of elaborating a system of elementary forces on the basis of the categories leads Kant to attempt an ontological account of caloric, an attempt that is likewise destined to remain fruitless. The ambivalence of the notion of ether in fascicle *Übergang 1-14* and the notion of the subject's self-positioning in fascicle VII further demonstrate Kant's effort to erase the distance between transcendental philosophy and metaphysics. The final stage of this evolution is reached when Kant posits man as the link between the world and God, thereby effectively denying the possibility of a transition between the sensible and the intelligible, and thus the possibility of a final systematic synthesis. What emerges is a declaration of the definitive failure of transcendental philosophy, which, instead of yielding the promised metaphysical system, leaves only an emptiness.

Thomson's monograph presents an original interpretation of Kant's thought, accompanied by several insightful textual analyses. For this reason, it constitutes a significant contribution to the study of the *Opus postumum*. Nonetheless, I must admit that I find none of the three central theses of Thomson's argument convincing. A strength of Kantian thought lies in the distinction between critique and doctrinal system. There is no doubt that critique aims at constructing a system of transcendental philosophy, but I do not believe that Kant ever intended to absorb critique into the doctrinal system. The critical moment is, and must remain, the stimulus that keeps the spirit of the system alive. The drive toward systematization crystallizes thought, whereas critique has the task of setting it in motion again. Therefore, the aporias of the system are productive: they reactivate the critical gesture. This tension between critique and system is permanent and constitutive of Kantian philosophy. The *Opus postumum*, in my view, *pace* Thomson, is nothing more than an *allgemeine Anmerkung* to the critical system, a place where Kant adds and revises, elucidates and clarifies, but never abandons the terrain of critical philosophy, whose primary task is to determine the boundaries of reason and the conditions for transcending those boundaries. The transcendental concept of ether and the notion of the subject's self-positioning are examples of boundary ideas of reason. *Unsolvable* ambivalences, contradictions, and paradoxes signal that reason has reached its limit. The failure of the *Opus postumum* lies in its inability to produce and present a complete

metaphysical system. This failure concerns doctrine. Critique, by contrast, succeeds in elucidating the boundary ideas of reason, the lines of tension within transcendental thought, beyond which lies the metaphysical emptiness to which Thomson refers: the idea of an absolute transcendence that is unknowable and even unspeakable, but which unveils itself only to thought daring enough to push against its own boundaries.

(Giovanni Pietro Basile)

G. ANTHONY BRUNO, *Facticity and the Fate of Reason After Kant*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2025, pp. 338 (ISBN: 9780198875673).

There are many books about the end of German Idealism. The classical account – articulated by the likes of Richard Kroner and Karl Löwith – usually moves from Kant to Hegel, passing through Fichte’s first *Wissenschaftslehre* and Schelling’s Identity Philosophy, before the travails of the Hegelian System, presuppositionless and all-encompassing, become too heavy to bear. The Sisyphean task of system-building falls apart, and gives rise to the distinctly unsystematic thinkers of the mid to late nineteenth century, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche being the classic illustrations. But with the advancement of scholarship on post-Kantian thought in Germany, this narrative is hardly tenable anymore: not only did both Fichte and Schelling continue to develop their respective philosophies much longer than the *Von Kant bis Hegel* account suggests, but other figures, such as F.H. Jacobi, play a pivotal role. Now, in an impressive and well-researched monograph, G. Anthony Bruno demonstrates that not only have certain figures and texts been in need of recovery: so too with a crucial concept, facticity. The term refers to the conditions of intelligibility that are always already present when discourse about them occurs. Sheer existence, the ineluctable presence of something *that* exists, cannot be integrated into a philosophical system as if it were some object downstream from further conditions.

For Bruno, the real reason for German Idealism’s downfall is its inadequate account of facticity. Subsequently, Heidegger, returning to and building on Kant’s careful approach to this question, becomes the thinker of facticity *par excellence*. What this book announces, however, is not

Heideggerian triumphalism, but rather an open question. This means, firstly, that Bruno has traced a different path into and out of German Idealism, filling lacunae and asking hitherto unasked questions, and secondly, has reached his own conclusions, grounded in this trajectory. As Bruno writes near the end of the book:

As I have tried to show, the fate of reason after Kant is to transform from a pure activity that derives absolutely necessary conditions of intelligibility from its own contradictions into a lived activity whose conditions of intelligibility are interpretable yet ultimately brute, which is to say, groundless or radically contingent. Philosophy can fruitfully interpret such conditions. However, it can never transcend them, since, by interpreting them, philosophy forever exhibits its own facticity (p. 300).

The book is filled with this kind of dense, thought-provoking writing. Never pedantic, it cuts through the obscure works of the German Idealists (the analyses of Fichte's 1804 *Wissenschaftslehre* on pp. 70-77 and Schelling's positive philosophy on pp. 193-214 are to be especially commended) to arrive at the strong objection made in the quotation above: how can the *thatness* that grounds existence be reduced to thought?

While we might associate the term 'facticity' with French phenomenologists like Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, the term was actually coined by Fichte. This is perhaps not coincidental: from Maine de Biran (1766-1824) onward, the question of reflection is as crucial in France as it is in Germany – and in both instances, integrating the factual into reflection is a major concern. But the question at hand is not Fichte's influence on French phenomenology, but rather the broader story of the historical trajectory from German Idealism to phenomenology, and the latter's recovery of Kant's cautiousness about first principles. Writes Bruno, «My primary philosophical claim will be that we find in phenomenology's revival of the Kantian senses of modesty and contingency a defensible, and indeed, superior response to the post-Kantian question» (p. 4).

The narrative necessarily begins with Kant. Prior to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the inevitable foundation for metaphysics was logic; and indeed, the preoccupation with the principle of identity, begun with Leibniz and reaching a fever pitch with Christian Wolff, bears witness to this. But grounding metaphysics in logic presents an enormous challenge: logic is fundamentally indifferent to what one might call the existential aspects of

metaphysics. Whether my actions are free or determined is, for example, a question to which logic has no clear answer. The result, on a metaphysical level, is seemingly unresolvable antinomies. Kant, rather than tinkering with the logic at the base of this, instead sought a new ground for metaphysics, a new logic, one that began not with first principles, but with the conditions of human experience. The existential element – the meaning of particular actions carried out by an individual in time and space – was no longer a metaphysical by-product of logical principles. Rather, this new transcendental logic would begin at the source, redefining the domain of metaphysical inquiry in such a way that adequate answers become possible.

But, as Bruno points out, Kant's shift in focus exposes a different weakness. Epistemologically, the fundamental elements that make cognition possible – the pure intuitions of space and time, the categories of the understanding, the reproductive imagination – are merely to be presumed, lest knowledge be impossible. This, says Kant, is simply the apparatus of the mind. Any higher principles governing these and providing for their origin are unknown to us. But what does it mean to say that the conditions of experience are ungrounded? For Bruno, this means that «Their necessity for possible experience is brute rather than absolute, since they are not deducible from a first principle. However unavoidable for us, the conditions of experience are radically, which is to say, at root, contingent» (p. 2). The crucial question that Bruno asks, in light of post-Kantian developments in metaphysics, is whether this radical contingency lets the bottom fall out of metaphysics, and makes cognition impossible for lack of a first principle. As Bruno elegantly phrases it, «can a science of intelligibility tolerate any conditions of intelligibility as brute facts?» (p. 2). For the German Idealists, the answer is no. The completion of the system of knowledge is necessary for the elimination of contradictory conditions, and this can only be done on the basis of a first principle. For later thinkers, especially Heidegger, the opposite is true: the groundlessness of the conditions of intelligibility is precisely what makes thinking possible in the first place.

Bruno uses the term 'facticity' to refer to the groundlessness or bruteness of the conditions of intelligibility. The facticity of, for example, space and time means that they are simply there in the background, ineluctable and indeducible. It is not contingent in the way an empirical object is: it is always already there. Bruno points out that while we might

associate this kind of thinking with (especially French) phenomenology and existentialism, its path from Königsberg to Paris has a historical trajectory, with J.G. Fichte being a key figure. Indeed, it is Fichte's quest for a first principle that gives rise to the term 'facticity'. It is the lack of a first principle that most preoccupies Kant's first readers, a question sharpened by the dangers of the most ready-to-hand solution to this problem: Spinozism. The course that Fichte must steer – between a factual abyss on the one hand, and imputations of Spinozism and its implied nihilism on the other – leads to what Bruno characterizes as a revision of Kant's transcendental logic. The *Wissenschaftslehre* does not determine the conditions of thought based on ineluctable facticity, but through a kind of *via negativa* of performative contradictions that culminates in the self-positing of the I. Put simply, Fichte will provide deductions for the fundamental elements of cognition, but without ever abandoning the methods of transcendental philosophy, staying within the confines of the activity of the I. Yet this, for Bruno, is already something different from Kant's basic method: transcendental logic has been transformed into dialectical logic, a move that will be completed by Hegel. For the latter, securing first principles implies a presuppositionless science through which what is indeterminate is increasingly mediated until rationality can be demonstrated without remainder. But for Bruno, the last step in this enterprise is not the Hegelian whole, but Schelling's attempt at dismantling the strategy that, in the wake of Kant and Fichte, he helped pioneer. For the late Schelling, *that (daß)* precedes *what (was)*, and existence itself cannot be integrated into the system.

Yet if Schelling signifies the shift from the 'practical' (in the Kantian-Fichtean sense) to the 'factual', other figures are pivotal in the transition to phenomenology. Emil Lask, an early twentieth-century neo-Kantian, productively misreads Fichte's late philosophy in a way that is almost reminiscent of Schelling: the individual subject cannot be deduced from the I in its *thatness*, its simple existence. This, of course, celebrates facticity rather than, as was the goal of the *Wissenschaftslehre*, eliminating it. Lask's fateful misreading, as Bruno calls it, is a methodological deviation from Fichte, but one that opens up phenomenological possibilities: «Lask misreads the role of deduction in this system [i.e., Fichte's] by misconstruing the problem that 'facticity' names and thereby misconstruing Fichte's 'exclusively' deductive solution to that problem. Nevertheless, this misreading is historically fortuitous, for, by thematizing material facticity, Lask

prefigures Heidegger's own conception of facticity» (p. 236). It is this, combined with Dilthey's hermeneutics, that will yield Heidegger's 'hermeneutics of facticity', which Bruno considers to be the last nail in the coffin of dialectical logic.

It is Heidegger who ultimately proves to be, for Bruno, the only satisfactory thinker of facticity. The problem with German Idealism is its reduction of what is factual to what can be dialectically adduced – perhaps a different mistake from Wolffian rationalism, but still one that seeks to eliminate presuppositions rather than interpret them. For Heidegger, instead, the proper attitude one is to take is that of *Entschlossenheit*, the resoluteness to accept that conditions are groundless. In brief, hermeneutics has superseded dialectic, showing that the Kantian project was still too attached to metaphysics. Bruno thematizes Heidegger's shift away from a dialectic approach to the conditions of intelligibility toward a hermeneutical one as an investigation into the Nothing. Heidegger inherits the question 'why is there something rather than nothing?' from classical metaphysicians, but addresses it in a hermeneutic way: understanding the ultimate groundlessness of intelligibility means allowing the nothing 'to nothing' (*das Nichts nichtet*). Writes Bruno, «In other words, the nothing nothings insofar as it 'unveils' the fact that the rationality or intelligibility of beings as a whole is radically contingent or factual in that they could well not be» (p. 260).

This book is a major contribution to scholarship on nineteenth- and twentieth-century German philosophy, making use of the most recent secondary sources and advances in the literature. Innovative and particularly noteworthy in Bruno's analysis are: the emphasis on Fichte's Berlin *Wissenschaftslehre* (i.e., his post-1800 work); an evaluation of Schelling's positive philosophy and his critique of Hegel, here eloquently expressed; the inclusion of Emil Lask in the narrative, a neglected figure in the history of philosophy; and a new account of Heidegger's path toward the hermeneutics of facticity in his Freiburg lectures. I expect it will be much-cited, and come to reframe the question of the 'Kantian Aftermath'. It is a fresh and stimulating contribution to a field of study sorely in need of its precision of argument and narrative force.

(Matthew Nini)