THE CONCRETE UNIVERSAL OF EMBODIED CONCEPTS

In this article, I examine the notion of concrete universal in Hegel’s philosophy through trends in philosophy of mind. I argue that the concrete universal, which is tied to the subjectivity and historicity of nature, can shed light on some issues within the current debates therein. More specifically, I contend that the concrete universal, which in Hegel’s view is embodied by the living organism – not applied externally to the world, but part of its very becoming – allows us to theorise the status of the environment apart from organisms, and thereby overcome the charge levelled at ecological psychology: that it reintroduces reliance on representations when because it holds that the organism ‘picks up’ information from the environment. Against this view, the environment apart from organisms not positively given, but this is not the same as saying it does not exist. Instead, it imposes constraints on the individual affordances that the organism perceives in their experienced environment, and is affected in return by how organisms navigate in the world. This problem can highlight the relevance of Hegel’s notion for current debates, and how these debates can elucidate the notion of concrete universal.