DIALETHEIST READING OF HEGEL’S DIALECTIC: BETWEEN RICHTIGKEIT AND WAHRHEIT

In Hegel’s Foundation Free Metaphysics, Moss ascribes to Hegel some sort of dialetheic conception of truth. According to this reading, every determination of Hegel’s logic has a contradictory structure in so far as it is, at the same time, true and false, or, as Moss claims, cancelled and preserved. I critically analyse this reading, first of all, by focusing on some differences between Priest’s and Hegel’s notion of truth: in Hegel’s dialectic truth is not the property of propositions, but of logical determination, and it cannot be accounted for as a relation of satisfaction of a given criteria external to truth bearers. Secondly, I explain that, even considering these differences, there is a sense in which Moss is right: each determination can be said to be true and false in so far as each determination is richtig and unrichtig. Thirdly, I show that Moss’s reading is not sufficient to shed light on Hegel’s insight of the truth (Wahrheit) of the contradictory structure of logical determinations.